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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
'\
THOMAS F. KIRKHAM, Administrator of the
Estate of William Kirkham, Deceased,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

CASE
NO. 8291

ORIEN A. SPENCER and VIOLA SPENCER,
his wife,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 25th day of January, 1952, William Kirkham,

now cleceased, entered into a written contract of sale of
certain real property which is described in the complaint of
the plaintiffs to Orien A. Spencer and Viola Spencer, his
wife, for the sum of $5,993.38, payable at the rate of $65.00
per month or more, with intevest at the rate of five per cent.
At pre-trial the parties stipulated that the plaintiff,
Thomas F. Kirkham, is the duly appointed, qualified and
acting executor and that the contract of sale properly describes the property and that the terms of the contract are
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accurate. The only fact reserved for trial was whether the
defendants paid to the plaintiff's decedent during the month
of August, 1953, the sum of $4,800.00. It was the defendants' contention that this amount had been paid and it was
the plaintiff's position that it had not.
It would appear from the evidence presented by the
plaintiff that the decedent was 77 years of age at the time
of his death, which was on September 6, 1953, and that he
was a widower and had lived alone for a long while. That
his brother, the plaintiff, did all his business for him, including his banking, and even assisted to the extent of drawing his contracts, (Tr. P. 4), and that this relationship had
continued for at least 10 years prior to his death.
Near the last of August the plaintiff testified that he
visited Mr. Hinton, at the request of the decedent, to retain
him to collect the delinquent amount then owing under the
contract with the defendants. The plaintiff judged the date
to be August 30, 1954.
The plaintiff testified that he did all the banking fior
his brother and that he did not bank any amount of $4,800.00. He admits that he did not inquire as to whether
the decedent had other bank accounts (Tr. P. 16) and he
further admits that he did not make a search of the home
and property of the decedent for any assets that may have
been on hand at the date of death, (Tr. P. 16) and that the
only inquiry that he made as to the assets of the !eState
were from two members of the decedent's family (Tr. P.
16). The plaintiff further admitted upon cross-examination that he did not know what monies we.re on hand at
the decedent's death or in his house, or in his wallet (Tr.
P. 17), and that he made no effort to find out. The plaintiff further admitted that he did not deposit all the money
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received by the decedent, and that he did not know what
happened to some of the money (Tr. P. 18), and that, in
fact, the only nl)oney that he deposited was that money
given to him to deposit by the decedent. The plaintiff stated on P. 36 of the transcript that he cannot remember what
any of the children told him about what they found in the
way of assets, if anything.
The only other witness called by the plaintiff at the
time of trial was Cleo K. Beagley, a daughter of the deQeased. She testified that she was present in the horuse
after the death of her father, and that she took part in a
search that was made of the house. She stated that as far
as her personal search was concerned, she, searched the
linen closet (Tr. P. 41), and that she was present when the
desk was searched, although she does nort recall what particular part she played in searching the desk. She admitted
that she made no inquiry at any bank (Tr. P. 42) or that
she looked in any place other than the house in search of
the assets of the estate. She confirmed on Page 40 of the
transcript that the only place that the family searched was
in the house.
After this evidence the plaintiff rested.
Defendant here moved to dismiss the case on the
grounds that the plaintiff did not prove a cause of action,
the evidence being insufficient to sustain the eomplaint, and
that the facts proven ~did not show a right to relief. The
defendant's motion was denied.
The defendant then proceeded to introduce Defendant's
Exhibit 3, a receipt for $4,800.00 signed by decedent. The
handwriting expert who testified (Tr. P. 47) stated that
there was no doubt that the person who signed Defendant's
Exhibits 1 and 2 signed the receipt, Exhibit 3, ~or $4,800.00.
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Exhibits 1 and 2 were two contracts notarized by the plaintiff and which bore the decedent's signature and which signatures the plaintiff admitted were genuine. The receipt
was received in evidence.
The defendant then called Orien A. Spencer, one of the
defendants. The defendant was not allowed to testify concerning the receipt because of the commonly called dead
man's statute (Tr. P. 51). The defendant then rested.
In rebuttal the plaintiff called as his witness his attorney, who testified that prior to September 6, 1953, approximately September 1, 1953, that he wrote the defendant a
letter asking him to come and see him but that the defendant did not come and see ·him prior to September 29, 1953.
This constituted the total rebuttal.
At this stage the plaintiff again rested and the defendant moved the court again to dismiss the case for the rea~on that the plaintiff had failed to prove a cause of action,
and that he had not carried the burden of proof in that the
plaintiff had not presented sufficient evidence for the court
to reach a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and for the furtheT reason that the plaintiff had presented absolutely no
evidence to refute the authenticity or genuineness of the
receipt.
The defendant's motion was denied and the court took
the matter undeT advisement.
The court on its own motion on the 19th day of October, 1954, ordered that further hearing upon the cause be
heard on the 25th day of October, 1954, at 1:30 P.M., in
order that the parties present evidence upon the following
points, to-wit:
"1. Evidence concerning the possession by the defendants of the sum of $4,800.00 in cash which could
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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have been, or which probably was, paid to the deceased
on or about the 21st day of August, 1953.
2. Further evidence of the search by plaintiff and ;or
the heirs of the decedent made either before or after
the bringing on of the cause for trial to discover the
possession of $4,800.00 in money in the decedent after
the 21st day of August, 1953, including banks in the
cities of Lehi, American Fork, Pleasant Grove, Provo
and Salt Lake City, and a more detailed search of the
premises wherein deceased lived after August 21, 1953,
and any other locations known to the heirs and representatives of the decedent wherein the said decedent
might have made temporary disposition of $4,800.00
paid to him prior to plaintiff's return from vacation on
August 22, 1953."
On October 25, 1954, the defendant again moved the
court to dismiss the case for the reasons stated at time of
trial on October 19, 1954, and for the further reason that
the court by reopening the case on its own motion and by
designating what matters were to be pro~ed and horw they
were to be proved, was acting beyond its authority and was,
in any event, abusing its discretion. This motion was denied.
The attorney for the defendants was una:ble to notify
the defendants of the court's order to reopen in time for
the hearing. However, the plaintiff proceeded to introduce
evidence along the line requested by the court, recalling to
testify Thomas F. Kirkham, Harvard Hinton, plaintiff's attorney, and Cleo Beagley, and calling as a new witness Leslie Goates. The defendant again renewed his mooorn to
dismiss, which was denied.
The case was continued until November 6, 1954, for
the purpose of allorwing the defendant to present the eviSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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dence requested by the court's Order to Reopen; however,
on the 5th of November, the parties, appeared before the
court and the defendant rested without presenting further
evidence. The plaintiff moved the court to re-open the case
to allow the p1ainti~f to present further evidence, but the
court denied the plaintiff's motion in this instance. The
court took the matter under adviserrJ,ent.
On November 8, 1954, the court rendered the judgment
complained of. The defendants moved for a new trial,
which motion was denied and the defendants appealed.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT 1
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE END
OF THiE PLAINTIFF'S CASE IN CHIEF SHOULD HAVE
BEEN GRANTED FOR THE REASON THAT THE
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE A CAUSE OF ACTION
AND FOR THE REASON THAT THE EVIDENCE
PROVEQ WAS INSUFFICIENT FOR THE COURT TO
GRANT THE RELIEF PRAYED FOR.
POINT 2
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE AND FOR JUDGMENT FOR THE DEFENDANT AFTER BOTH PARTIES HAD RESTED
SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED FOR THE REASON
THAT THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
SUSTAIN A JUDGMENT FOR THE PLAINTIFF AND
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE DEFENDANTS
WAS PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF PAYMENT AND
WAS UNREFUTED BY THE PLAINTIFF.
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POINT 3
THE COURT ERRED IN RE-OPENING THE CASE
ON ITS OWN MOTION AND IN DESIGNATING THE
MANNER, KIND AND AMOUNT OF EVIDENCE THAT
WOULD BE REQUIRED BY THE COURT.
POINT 4
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANfS'
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED UPON THE ERRORS OF LAW COMMITTED BY THE COURT.

ARGUMENT
POINT 1
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE END
OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE IN CHIEF SHOULD HAVE
BEEN GRANTED FOR THE REASON THAT THE
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE A CAUSE OF ACTION
AND FOR THE. REASON THAT THE EVIDENCE
PROVED WAS INSUFFICIENT FOR THE COURT TO
GRANT THE RELIEF PRAYED FOR.

At the end of the plaintiff's case in chief the defendants
moved the court to dismiss the plaintiff's ease (Tr. P. 43)
for the reason that they had not proved a prima facie case.
The defendants were then entitled to a non-suit on the basis
of insufficiency of evidence.
It was obviorus from the facts proven that there had
been no showing that the defendant had not paid the $4,800.00. In fact, there were from the plaintiff's own testimony many reasonable and probable e~xplanations of where
the money was or had gone. It must be remembered that
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the plaintiff brought this action and in his pleadings alleged
that this payment among others had not been paid. This
was specifically denied by the defendant and in fact the defendants pleaded that the defendant made payments to the
said William Kirkham regularly and consistently and according to the contract, and that on the 21st day of August,
1953, paid the decedent, William Kirkham, the sum of $4,800.00, which was believed to be the entire balance of the
principal and interest owing on the contract, and the decedent gave the defendants a receipt for $4,800.00 and agreed
that he would calculate the exact amount owing and would
deliver the deed to the defendant when he had done so and
this amount was paid. The receipt which is admitted herein verifies such pleading.
Surely it is incumbent that plaintiff prove lack of payment, and not just that the money did not appear as one
item in a bank account that was handed to the Administrator.
The plaintiff testified (Tr. P. 12) in answer to his attorney's question that it was his duty to collect the assets
of the estate and that he had filed an inventory, and in doing so he had not found the $4,800.00. It is fundamental
that one of the chief duties of the Executor is to collect and
search out the assets of the estate. However, in this case,
the Executor did nothing to find out what was owing the
estate, or to search through the belongings of the decedent
in an effort to discover whether the money had been found
or was among the assets of the decedent, but because it
was not in one item in the bank account book of the Lehi
State Bank, he assumed that it had not been paid. The entire testimony of the of the plaintiff on cross ~am!iantion
indicated that there .was not sufficient proof to justify a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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verdict. This is clearly shown by the following testimony:
(Transcript P. 15, L. 17 to P. 18)
MR. HOWARD: Q. "Did he ever bank anything
without you being present, or without ~ou doing it or
him?
A. The last year or so I did all of his bankking
for him.
Q. How do you know you did?
A. All that I know about, from this-Q. You did all the banking in these two bank accounts?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You don't know whether or not he had a bank
account in the Farmers & Merchants Bank in Provo,
do you?
MR. HINTON: Yiour Honor, I object to that. He
has testified, and it is in the inventory, that there were
no other bank accounts. He is badgering the witness.
THE COURT: He may be cross examined about
it anyway. Overruled.
MR. HOWARD: Q. You don't know whether or
not he had a bank account in the Farmers & Merchants
Bank, do you?
A. I do not know.
Q. And you don't know whether he had one in
the Peoples State Bank, of American Fork?
A. I do not know.
Q. Or in the Pleasant Grove Bank?
A. I do not know.
Q. Or in any other bank, but the Lehi Bank, do
you?
A. That is the only bank I know about.
Q. Did you ,make inquiry at any other bank ?
A. I did not.
Q. So he might have had a bank account somewhere else, and you might not know it; isn't that so?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A. Could be so.
Q. That's right. And where did you look for
money?
A. Where did who look for money?
Q. Yes, you didn't find any in his home?
A. Ask your first question.
Q. Where did you look for money, when you
searched the assets of the estate?
A. I did not search the assets, at the time of his
death.
Q. Well, subsequently, did you search the assets
of the estate?
A. From all the evidence that was given to me
by members of his family, I took the assets.
Q. What inquiry did you, yourself, as administrator of the estate, make in the affairs and property
of the decedent? What inquiry did you make as to
property? What was in his house?
A. Two members of his family.
Q. Did they do it?
A. They searched his belongings.
Q. But you didn't?
A. I didn'rt:.
Q. In fact, you have made no search ~at all yourself, have you, into his belongings? Have you?
A. I have taken all of his accormts, and listed
them.
Q. From what somebody gave you?
A. From what he gave me.
Q. Did you go through his bureau drawers.
A. I did not.
Q. Did ~ou go through the cupboard in the
kitchen?
A. I did not.
Q. Did you go through the things in the basement?
A. I did not.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Q. Or anyplace in the house?
A. I did not.
Q. Or the shelves of the closet?
A. No.
Q. So you don't know what moneys were on hand
at his death in his house, do you?
A. I don't know.
Q. You didn't go in his wallet, did you?
A. I did not. The ~mbers of his family did all
of those things. It was their concern, not mine.
Q·. Who were there when they did these things?
A. His children.
Q. Who were they?
A. Well, he has fuur children.
Q. Which child did these things, to your knowledge?
A. I don't know.
Q. You don't know who did it?
A. I don't know.
Q. You filed an affidavit with the Court that a
search had been made, and that these were the things
in his estate, did you not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And yert you had not made a search had you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you make a search?
A. Sure, to get all these records together.
Q. But you didn't make a search of the assets
of the estate?
A. From the members o!f his family.
Q. Did you deposit everything Mr. Kirkham received in the bank?
A. Not everything, no, sir.
Q. What did he do with some of the moneys that
he received?
A. I don't know.
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Q. He had moneys that he received that he didn't
deposit, didn't he?
A. I don't know.
Q. Well, you know he didn't deposit everything
he received, don't you?
A. I don't know that.
Q. Let me ask you this then, Mr. Kirkham: Did
you deposit all the moneys that were received from
Mr. Albert Peterson, on a contract of Mr. Peterson?
A. I don't know what ~oney that he brought to
me represented. What money he brought to me, to
deposit for him, I deposited. Other than that, I made
no deposits for him, only money that he brought to me,
to take over to the bank for him, is what I deposited
for him.''

You will note specifically that he admits that no search
was made (Tr. P. 16). He states, "I did not search the assets, at the time of death", and that (Tr. P. 17) he only
took what assets were given to him by members of the decedent's family.
How could the court conclude from this testimony, and
this is the principal testim!ony of the plaintiff's case, that
the defendants had not paid the $4,800.00, especially where
by their pleadings they state that they did thereby pui'ffie
matter in issue. The only further evidence the court could
take into consideration was the testimony of Mrs. Beagley,
who ~ould testify only to what she found and as to what
she did, and she testified in substance and effect that she
did not find the $4,800.00, although she admits that in the
house at the same time searching was her sister, her two
brothers and her husband. She admits (Tr. P. 41) that
she searched the linen closet alone, which obviously means
that the others were doing something else. She also adSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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mits that the search she made, and what she supposes
the others made, was limited to the house (Tr. P. 42), and
that she nor anyone else made any further search other
than in the house, her reply being "That wasn't my job,
that was the administrator's job." (Tr. P. 42)
Mr. Hinton's testimony was without any probative
merit, the subSitance of it being that he wrote a letter to
the defendant, Mr. Spencer, on September 1, 1953, and that
by Septent.ber 29th the defendant had not been in to see
him (Tr. P. 57, L. 19 to 22).
It is so fundamental that the plaintiff has the burden
of proof that the defendant will not on this point submit
authorities. The defendants are aware that the burden in
this case requires the plaintiff to prove somewhat of a negative proposition, that of non-payment; however, even in
this case a mere statement that it was not paid is not sufficient. Something more must be shown. There should be,
at least, a showing by some evidence that it was not paid;
!his is done in the usual case by the obligee testifying that
he did not receive the money. In the instant case the obligee is dead, so it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to show
that he did not receive the money. Is it sufficient for the
plaintiff to show this by testifying that he has looked in a
bank book of the decedent and someone has told him that
they searched the decedent's desk and didn't find it? Is
it again sufficient when one of the searchers as corroboration says she didn't find it but admits her search was. limited to the decedent's house, and then to only parts of it?
It was so obvious that the money was, and probably is, so:rneplace else that the court should have granted a non-suit.
Even the trial court, by its own order, admitted that the
money had probably been paid and that if the plaintiff
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looked he would probably find it. The court said in its order
to the defendant to produce more evidence:
"1 Evidence concerning the possession by the defendants of the sum of $4,800.00 cash which could have
been, or which probably was, paid to deceased on or
about the 21st day of August, 1953."
(Emphasis added)
Surely the plaintiff should have at least probable reasons to believe the debt to be unpaid before causing the defendants to defend a Iaw suit, and where it is apparent from
the plaintiff's own testimony that the debt could have been
paid, then there is a failure of proof. A good way to analyze the problem is to say: "Assume the defendants had
rested without presenting any evidenoe, could the court at
this stage and having received this quantum of evidence,
have granted judgment to the plaintiff?" The answer to
this question is "no".
The appellant's contention that they should have been
granted a non-suit in the case below upon the facts stated
could not be stated more clearly than in the language used
by this Court in the case of Winegar v. Slim Olson, Inc., 252
P.2d 205. That was a case brought by the plaintiff torecover for the loss of a Diesel engine allegedly caused by
the negligent installation of an oil filter bag by the defendant's employee, and was tried without a jury. The fact to
be proved in that case was that the filter bag, because of its
negligent installation, clogged the oil line, thereby causing
the damage complained of.
The plaintiff proved that such an installation could have
caused such damage; however, upon cross-examination the
defendant established that some other causes could have
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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clogged the oil line. Similar to the principal case in which
the plaintiff says he hasn't seen the $4,800.00 but where
the defendant establishes upon cross-examination that he
hasn't looked for it and that it might very well have been
found if he had looked. The court in that case said:
"It is not reasonable to require a judge, on motion
to dismiss under Rule 41 (b) , to determine merely
whether there is a prima facie case, such as in a jury
trial should go to the jury, when there is no jury-to determine merely whether there is a prima facie case
sufficient for the consideration of a trier of facts when
he is himself the trier of the facts. To apply the jury
trial practice in a non-jury proceedings would be to
erect a requirement compelling a defendant to put on
his case and the Court to spend the time and incur the
public expense of hearing it if the plaintiff had, according to jury trial concepts, made a ,case for the jury, even
though the judge had concluded that on the whole of
the plaintiff's evidence the plaintiff ought not to prevail. A plaintiff who had had full opportunity to put
on his own case and has failed to convince the judge,
as trier of the facts, of a right to relief, has no legal
right under the due process clause of the Constitution,
to hear the defendant's case, or to compel the Court to
hear it, merely because the plaintiff's case is a prima
facie one in the jury trial sense of the term."
Winegar v. Slim Olson, Inc., 252 P.2d 205

But even assuming that this case had been tried before
a jury, the plaintiff did not establish, even then, a case that
would have prevented a non-suit under the rule announced
in the above case, wherein the court said:
"If art the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence the
Court decides that the plaintiff has not established a
prima facie case or cause of action against the defend-
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ant, a judgment of non-suit may be properly entered.
In order to establish a prima facie case the plaintiff
must present some competent evidence on every element needed to make out the cause of action. The test
is whether or not there is some substantial evidence in
support of every essential fact which the plaintiff is required to prove in order to entitle him to recover. Robinson v. Salt Lake City, 37 Utah 520, 109 P. 817. If
the evidence and the inferences are of such character
as would authorize reasonable men to arrive at different
conclusions as to whether all the essential facts were
or were not proved, then the question is one for the
jury and a non-suit should be denied."
Even by the test used in cases in which there is a jury,
it is difficult to see how reasonable men could differ on
the question that the facts proven did not prove a cause
of action. It is obvious that there were essential facts not
proven, such as whether the plaintiff knew upon some reasonable basis that the $4,800.00 had not been paid. There
cannot be found anywhere in the record any substantial
proof of non-payment.
The court was the trier of the fact in this particular
case, and its view of the evidence can probably not be questioned as to what we!ight was placed upon it, but in regard
to whether the defendant testified in a convincing and persuasive manner, the court should note his inability to identify the signature of his brother, the decedent, upon repeated examination, and when asked to compare the purported signature with the admittedly genuine signature, his
testimony is seen to be hostile, purposely unresponsive, and
evasive. (See Tr. Pages 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27, where he
says, when questioned about his brother's signature, that he
could not recognize anything that he didn't notarize, and
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then compare it with his testimony on Page 77 of Transcript
in regard to a letter he received from the Bank of Pleasant
Grove about a bank account.)
Referring to the letter:
"And what bank is it?
Bank of Pleasant Grove.
And who is this signed by?
A. J. A. West, Vice-President and Cashier.
Q. Do you know who Mr. West is?
A. I do.
Q. And do you know that he is the Vice-President and Cashier of that particular bank?
A. Yes Sir.
MR. HINTON: Your Honor, we offer Plaintiff's
Exhibit U in as evidence.
MR. HOWARD: May I voir dire the witness, Your
Honor?
THE COURT: You may.
MR. HOWARD: Q. Do you recognize that as
Mr. Junius West's signature?
A. I do, yes."
Q.
A.
Q.

Page 81 of Transcript:
Q. "Is there any reason why you would be more
able to recognize Mr. Junius West's signature than you
would Mr. William Kirkham's signature?"
A. I do not know.
Q. You mean you do not know of a reason?
A. I do not know of a reason.
Q. You were unable to identify Mr. Kirkham's
signature, weren't you? (referring to Page 23, etc.)
A. Sometimes I do not know.
Q. Which times are they, Mr. Kirkham?
A. I do not know."
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There is no question that the defendants have denied all
the rr•aterial allegations of the plaintiff's complaint and by
stipulation the only issue being whether the $4,800.00 had
been paid and the plaintiff having failed to prove, even
slightly, that it had not, should have been non-suited. A
good discussion of the burden of proof in general is found
in Nichols Applied Evidence, Vol. 1, Page 896.
POINT 2
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE AND FOR JUDGMENT FOR THE DEFENDANT AFTER BOTII PARTIES HAD RESTED
SHOULD HlAVE BEEN GRANTED FOR THE REASON
THAT THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
SUSTAIN A JUDGMENT FOR THE PLAINTIFF AND
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE DEFENDANT
WAS PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF PAYMENT AND
WAS UNREFUTED BY THE PLAINTIFF.
When both parties had rested the defendant again made
a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's case for insufficiency of
the evidence. At this time it would appear to the appellants
that there -could be no question but that the court should
deny the plaintiffs judgment and should dismiss their complaint because of a failure of proof. The court by its order
says as much, otherwise there would be no point in requirthe plaintiff to submit further evidence and specifying the
kind of evidence necessary, unless there was an insufficiency of evidence that would prohibit the court from granting
judgment.
When the defendant introduced the receipt, it had
itself proved a prima facie case. It is the law that one
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prima facie case is sufficient to offset or equalize the case
presented by the plaintiff in his ·case in chief. The general
rule in this respect is as follows:
"The presumption that a debt evidenced by a negotiable instrument is unpaid arising from the production of the instrument by the payee is rebutted by receipts in full for all claims due to the payee which were
admitted by the payee's failure to deny their genuineness or validity."
Nichols Applied Evidence, Vol. 4, Sec. 6, P. 3939
There was not one scintilla of evidence offered by the
plaintiff in the case below to rebut the receipt offered, nor
was it contradicted or explained. Under such circumstances the law is that such a receipt is conclusive evidence of
payment.
"A receipt is merely prima facie evidence, and is
not conclusive, unless not contradicted or explained."
Nichols Applied Evidence, Vol 4, Sec. 6, P. 3939
(Emphasis added)
''A receipt in full of all demands, unexplained and
uncontradicted, will defeat an action on a negotiable instrument given before the date of the receipt."
Nichols Applied Evidence, Vol. 4, Sec. 8, P. 3940
McKenzie v. Ray, 168 Cal. 618, 143 Pac. 1018
"A receipt for money is prima facie evidence of
the truth of the statements therein contained."
U. S. F. & G. Co. v. Martin, 77 Ore. 369, 149 Pac.
1923
"A receipt is not an instrument that the law requires for protection of, or as notice to third parties,
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but is only prima facie evidence of payment of an obligation."
Amer. Bridge Co. v. Murphy, 13 Kan. 35
Kuykendall v. Lambert, 68 Okla. 258, 173 Pac. 657
"A receipt acknowledging the payment of money
is prima facie evidence of payment, in favor of the party producing it, when the genuineness of the receipt
is proved by a preponderance of the evidence, but such
evidence may be rebutted by competent testimony."
Stout v. Myatt, 13 Kans. 232
If we ~search the record we will find nowhe·re within a
denial or a contraduction of any sort in regard to the receipt. It was introduced and is self-explanatory In a similar case from California in which the receipt was given and
no reasonable explanation was offered, (although the explanation offered was at least ·more substantial than the absolutely unrefuted rec€-i.pt in this case) the court in reviewing the evidence said:

"To meet this evidence (evidence of indebtedness)
respondent produced a receipt dated June 16, 1930,
which is in the following language: 'Received of J. R.
Brightman ten dollars payed in full up to date. $10.00.
Mrs. M. E. Brown.' Appellant admitted signing this
receipt, but testified that it was given to her to cover
rental of a room occupied by Brightman. It was for
the trial court to determine whether or not appellant's
testimony in this regard was true. The language of
the receipt is sufficiently broad to indicate that it
amounted to a written acknowledgment that payment
in full of all demands had been made It is now the rule
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titled to. prevail, unless overcome by clear and satisfactory evidence."
Brown v. Gow, 18 P.2d 377, 128 Cal. App. 671
(Emphasis and parenthesis added)
In the above case the court had to interpolate even to
determine that the receipt was applicable to the debt sued
upon; however, in the pres.ent case, there is no question
about it. In fact, its authenticity is even more apparent
when we read the receipt.
Defendants' Exhibit 3
"August 21, 1953
Received of Orien Spencer
~orty-Eight Hundred Dollars
Final payment on Home, Principal to be adjusted and
deeds to be received.
js/ William Kirkham"
$4800.00
In fact, the trial judge's own consideration of the receipt is of significance. On (Tr. P: 64) he says:

"I can tell you now, that I am inclined to think
that the Court is going to be bound to give full credit
to the receipt. I think the Court is going to be bound
to do that. That is subject to further consideration,
but so that--there are people here, that are interested, and would like to know what the Court's trend
of thought is. There is a definite argument upon the
face of Exhibit 3, and it was emphasized by counsel
and the Court has observed it: If this were a faked
receipt, it is hard for the Court to see any reason why
there would be the added statement in it: "Principal
to be adjusted and deeds to be received."
The court goes on justifying its conclusion about the
receipt, as can be seen in the Transcript, P. 64.
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In the case of Gallaher v. Theilbar Realities, which case
is in point upon the question of payment and receipt, the
court said:
"A receipt is not a contract and may therefore be
explained or contradicted by parol evidence, 20 Cal.
Jur. 956, but it is prima facie evidence of payment, and
therefore the production of a receipt imposes upon the
plaintiff the burden of 'going forward to impeach the
receipt.'" 48 C. J. 639.

"* * * * There was no attempt made to impeach
the receipt or to explain that it was intended to be other than it appeared on its face. * * * * "
"Under applicaJble law heretofore stated, the deendant made a prima facie showing of payment which
was not overcome in any manner; and consequently
the implied finding that the note was nort given and received as absoJute payment is not sustained by any evidence. Judgment is reversed and the cause remanded
to the district court of Cascade County, with direction
to enter judgment of dismissal in favor of the defendant."
Gallaher v. Theilbar Realties, 18 P2d 1101, 93
Mont. 421
The law announced above would put the plaintiff or
respondent in the identieal position of the plaintiff in the
above case, which would put upon the respondent the burden of "going forward to impeach the receipt," which the
facts show the respondent did not do.
POINT 3
THE COURT ERRED IN RE-OPENING THE CASE
ON ITS OWN MOrriON AND IN DESIGNATING THE
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MANNER, KIND AND AMOUNT OF EVIDENCE THAT
WOULD BE REQUIRED BY THiE COURT.

The appellants concede that broad latitude and discretion is allowed the trial court in matters of reopening a
case. However, nowhere have the appellants been able to
find authority that would support the action of the court in
this case, where the initiating movant was the court itself.
A motion to reopen is always made by one of the parties, and ordinarily it is upon the basis of newly discovered
evidence. As a general rule the ·court will grant the motion if it can be shown that the evidence to be produced is
of a material nature. This is usually established by affidavit or by an offer of proof.
It is also a general rule, and one that is seldom abused,
that the attorney is the best judge of what evidence he desires to introduce, and in what manner he wants to try his
case. It may well be that he is not as skilled as the court,
however, he must account to his client for his actions, and
it must be assumed that the trial procedures used are to the
best interests of his client. If this fundamental principle is
not so, then it would be just as well if the parties were not
represented by counsel and that the court by its own methods interrogate the parties, determine what evidence it desires to receive, and to resolve the differences between the
parties. It would appear to the appellants that this is no
more and no less than what the court did in the instant ·case.

Not only were the defendants unable to govern the
course of conduct of their side of the trial, but they were
also required to defend their position twice on two different occasions with respect to matters that they could properly have defended themselves on in the first trial. There
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is no showing, and it cannot even be implied, that the facts
that the plaintiff was ordered to produce could not have
been produced at the regularly scheduled time of trial.
The great harm in such procedure is that it informs
the parties of the court's pre-decision of the matter upon
the condition that the facts ordered produced are produced.
It allows (as is obvious from the transcript in the principal
case) the witnesses to change their testimony in such respects as to conform with the order of the court. For example, take the testimony of Mrs. Beagley. Upon the first
trial her testimony was quite specific that her search was
limited to the house and that she did certain things alone
and did not know what the other parties did at all tim.es.
When recalled, she was allowed to testify, over the defendants' objection, to those facts that she had previously testified to; however, this time the search was of the most copious magnitude; it even included the garage and the grounds.
Compare her testimony shown from P. 88 of the Transcript
toP. 93 with her testimony on P. 42. There can be no question but what her testimony was altered to satisfy the
order of the court.
The court's only basis for such an order is that it felt
such an order was necessary to reach a just decision between the parties; however, it should be apparent that the
injustice of such an order, and the abuse of discretion in
granting such an order, far outweighs any additional evidence which the court might receive in order to come to a
conclusion resolving the matter.
The appellants cannot find any authority either for or
against the proposition of the court making such an order
on its own motion. This is probably because such practice
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~~~

is so obviously an
of discretion that no court has ventured to do it before, and so no appellate court has had to
rule on it. According to American Jurisprudence, Vol. 53,
P. 109, cases may be reopened upon the motion of one of
the sides, and then only to introduce material evidence
which is either newly discovered, was not presented because
of inadvertence or excusable neglect, and where it is apparent that the party so moving has acted in good faith.
The text authorities also indicate that the· time the
motion is made also has a bearing on the right to reopen.
In other words, a motion to reopen during the trial and before the case is submitted to the court or jury is much more
favorably received than one made after the case is submitted, and a motion made after court has taken a matter under advisement, has been adjourned and the parties have
excused their witnesses and have relied upon the respective
rests of each of the litigants has even less standing and the
court's discretion in this instance is even more limited. To
hold otherwise would be to say that the court, on its own
motion, can prolong the trial and retrial of a case indefinitely.
In any event, a case should not be reopened to allow
counsel to experiment rather than to develop his case. In
the principal case the evidence introduced by counsel for
plaintiff and respondent did nothing to refute the prima
facie case established by the defendants, and was immaterial, irrelevant and incompetent evidence. All of the evidence received after the trial, but pursuant to an order of
the court, was gathered after the parties had rested and
over a year from the date of death of the decedent. The
very remoteness of such evidence would make it incompetent because of the many factors that could and did inter-
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vene. For example, the house in which the decedent was
living at the date of his death had been rented for approximately a year, and there is not even a showing of any kind
that inquiry had been made of the tenants or that the house
had been researched. Note the testimony of Mr. Hinton,
attorney for the plaintiff, as set forth on Pages 99 and 100
of the Transcript:
BY MR. HOWARD:
Q.,"Did you make any search other than that, Mr.
Hinton?
A. You mean-Q. FOT the $4800.
A. I searched all the papers and documents that
were turned over to me by the administrator, and the
same papers and documents that were testified were
found on that search and turned over to Mr. Thomas
Kirkham, the administrator. I checked each document
carefully.
Q. When was the house rented?
A. As to the date, I couldn't be sure, but it would
be approximately--! would say from two weeks to
a month after the death.
Q. Did you inquire of the people who rented the
house, if they found any money?
A. I did not. I didn't feel it was necessary.
Q. Did Mr. Kirkham live alone?
A. William Kirkham, he did.
MR. HOWARD:! have no further questions.
MR. HINTON: Your Honor, that will conclude
our evidence as to that aspect of the case. We reserve
our right to offer rebuttal evidence, when the defendant's portion of the case is presented.
MR. HOWARD: We again would like to renew
our motion to dismiss, on the ground that they haven't
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proved a prima facie case. We think the most obvious
spot to look has been overlooked, and we think they
haven't carried the burden.
THE COURT: The motion is denied.''
Even taking the evidence that was offered pursuant to
the order of the court, the plaintiff did not prove a prima
facie case. The evidence received was merely cumulative
in value and did nothing to refute or eontradiet the receipt.
In fact, the evidence produced did not by any means show
that, even then, a thorough search had been made, as indicated in the above testimony. Surely at this time the
court should have granted the defendant's motion.
After the defendant had again rested, the plaintiff
moved the court, this time on his own motion, to reopen the
case for a second time to allow him to put in further evidence that he claimed would add substantially to his case,
and he made an offer of proof. This time the court quite
properly refused to allow the motion of the plaintiff, and
it was denied.
POINT 4
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEND~S'
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED UPON THE ERRORS OF LAW COMMITTED BY THE COURT.
The principal errors of law committed by the court and
duly set out above constitute the foundation for this motion. It is the position of the appellants that the court having been advised of its errors should have granted a new
trial.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The facts of this case are novel, and errors committed
are such that support injustice. In the first place, the court
has instituted trial by new and novel procedure, and has
deviated so far from the civil procedure that we know of
that the appellants were unable to know to what extent
they could rely upon orthodox procedure in the preparation
and trial of their case.
In the second place, viewing the evidence presented by
the plaintiff, and giving him the benefit of all presumptions
and inferences as can be applied to such evidence, he has
not proved a prima facie case at any stage of trial.
In the third place, assuming that the evidence presented by the plaintiff was sufficient to prove a prima facie
case, it was not sufficient to allow the relief prayed for when
contradicted and refuted by the receipt introduced by the
defendants. At this time the plaintiff's case was at the
very least equalized and the plaintiff did not meet his burden of going forward to overcome the case presented by the
defendants.
Under no possible theory of law could the court have
rightly decided the case as it did. The defendants respectfully petition this Court to reverse the ruling of the trial
court and to order it to enter judgment for the defendants.
Respectfully submitted,
JACKSON B. HOWARD
SANDGREN, HOWARD AND FRAZIER
Attorneys for Appellants

290 North University Ave.
Provo, Utah
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